

## PLATO AND THE 'APXH KAKΩN

COOK WILSON remarks that one of the chief doctrines of the *Timaeus* 'relates to the existence of evil . . . all cosmogonies which attribute the world to some divine activity find a difficulty here. Some assume another spirit, an evil one, though partly subordinate to the good one; others, to avoid making an evil spiritual principle, assume an unintelligent matter, or in general some form of Necessity beside the Good Spirit. We should suppose that Plato, if not monist, would incline to the latter and should have thought he clearly adopted it in the *Timaeus*.'<sup>1</sup> In *Laws X*, 'soul' is the cause of evil as of good. So Plato says one thing at one time, another at another. But his interpreters do not like to admit this. Professor Cornford found the spiritual view of evil lurking in the *Timaeus* too. Mr. Vlastos<sup>2</sup> and lately the Rév. Père Festugière,<sup>3</sup> though they differ about the meaning of *Laws X*, agree that for Plato the κακοποιόν is always matter. I think that we should not try too hard to smooth over the discrepancies in what Plato says about evil. They call attention to something obscure, perhaps incoherent, in his metaphysical thinking.

Cornford reads the *Timaeus* with the help of *Laws X*. 'Irrational and merely necessary motions and changes, with casual and undesigned results, actually occur in nature at all times, as well as those which are subservient to rational ends . . . And since, on Platonic principles, all physical motion must be due to a living soul, I do not see how to escape the conclusion that the World-Soul is not completely rational.'<sup>4</sup> There is no trace of a Devil in the *Timaeus*; the source of evil must be the World-Soul itself, that is to say, if Plato always assumes that ψυχή is the ἀρχή κινήσεως. But to a reader coming fresh to the *Timaeus*, unbiased by recollections of any other dialogue, τὸ σωματοειδές is the κακοποιόν. The *Timaeus* accounts for evil in terms of a contest between Reason and Necessity, the struggle of a workman with materials that are recalcitrant, that limit his purposes, and make perfection unattainable even by God. These are the Forms, Space and γένεσις. ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῆ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι. (52d.)

For the most part the Divine Workman's difficulties are a hackneyed theme. He is making a copy of the world of Forms in which not all Forms 'combine'; their want of κοινωνία will be reflected in the product; all conceivable advantages will not be realised. Then Plato assumes that embodiment involves a certain degradation for the Form. He is not saying that the Potter's hand shakes, rather that the very being of a particular thing is imperfection, for the ἄπειρον element in the mixture keeps it from being a perfect instance of the Form. Χώρα is the ἄπειρον here, Plato's matter.<sup>5</sup> For Plato a material thing is a region of space in which causal properties are manifested.<sup>6</sup> What properties a thing will have depends on its spatial configuration, and the διακόσμησις is simply the delimitation of these regions within the original ἄπειρον, whose nature the Demiurge must accept and make the most of.

Γένεσις is more mysterious. Here it is not the sensible world, for that is the product of the διακόσμησις, not a prerequisite.<sup>7</sup> I take it to be the same as κίνησις in *Laws X*, and I shall use the word κίνησις by preference, assuming it covers coming-into-being, motion, and

<sup>1</sup> *Statement and Inference II*, 867.

<sup>2</sup> *CQ XXXIII*, 71 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Rev. de philologie*, XXI.

<sup>4</sup> *Plato's Cosmology*, 209-10.

<sup>5</sup> We must distinguish the matter which is equivalent to ὕλη from the Workman's materials, of which χώρα is one, and from the material world, the product.

<sup>6</sup> That is, the physical object is a fiction; the fact that causal properties are manifested in a certain region of space is an ultimate fact. The objection is that if a region has causal properties, it is a substance and not a region. (Perhaps this is the real cause of Taylor's reluctance to call χώρα

matter. *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, 347.) On the other hand, the contents of the receptacle, the εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μνημάτα (50c), might suggest sensibilia. Is it possible that Plato's Heracliteanism is an anticipation of the Event Theory of Continuance (see e.g., *Theaetetus* 157bc), and that he regards the material thing as a continuous stream of sensuously qualified particulars which come into being apart from any observer? On this view πάντα βεῖ has a plain meaning, and the objectionable substratum of change is even more thoroughly eradicated than by the generally accepted Aristotelian interpretation.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 27d f.

change of all kinds.<sup>8</sup> In the state of chaos space is a receptacle filled with strange contents, εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξίοντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα (50c), in ceaseless change and motion. Questions can be asked about the cause of their coming-into-being; they must have some shape and some colour, and if νοῦς is responsible for πέρας wherever it is found, νοῦς is already at work in chaos. But we need not pursue these anomalies. Whatever we may think of the time-question,<sup>9</sup> we must agree with Cornford that the description of chaos will not bear close inspection, but it is particularly obvious that change and motion in chaos make nonsense. (It would require a continuity of being these 'contents' cannot have.) For all that, Plato's intention is plain—to declare that κίνησις in all its forms is an ἄπειρον, waiting to be given order by the Demiurge.

Νοῦς struggles to subdue ἀνάγκη.<sup>10</sup> The Demiurge does his best with these materials and succeeds on the whole, but to some extent they resist, and the evil of the world is simply this element of disorder that survives from chaos. So matter, τὸ σωματοειδές, is the κακοποιόν.<sup>11</sup>

But this simple interpretation is often questioned. Professor Cornford thinks we can dig deeper.

As we have seen, in the *Timaeus* κίνησις is represented as something 'given'; it has no origin, any more than the Forms or Space.<sup>12</sup> But Cornford is sure that the thought that ψυχή is ἀρχὴ κινήσεως was constantly present to Plato's mind, as much in the *Timaeus* as in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*.<sup>13</sup> Apart from 46e which echoes at least the words in which the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως argument is expressed elsewhere, Cornford can point to the earlier part of the dialogue where the world is called a ζῶον with a soul, and there is a faint suggestion that the soul is responsible for its movement. When God shaped the world's body, 'he caused it to turn about uniformly in the same place and within its own limits and made it revolve round and round' (34a), but when the World-Soul is inwoven, I think it is implied that the Soul is responsible for the motion.<sup>14</sup> In Plato's scheme this revolution of the world as a whole is the physical counterpart of the mental movement of the Same,<sup>15</sup> while the movement of the Different is imparted to the planets (36cd). With it Plato comes nearest to making the World-Soul the cosmic ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, but he nowhere represents it as the ultimate cause of all events in the comprehensive sense required by *Laws* X. Nothing is said to connect ψυχή with the other κινήσεις of all kinds within the world. In the central part of the *Timaeus* describing the struggle of Reason with Necessity, there is not the smallest hint that ψυχή is responsible for κίνησις. It may be replied that this is the myth of νοῦς δημιουργός and, to νοῦς, κίνησις is 'given'; that Plato

<sup>8</sup> Both γένεσις and κίνησις have a wider and a narrower meaning. In the *Timaeus* γένεσις includes κίνησις = locomotion. In *Laws* X κίνησις includes γένεσις = coming-to-be. (See also *Parm.* 155e–156b and Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, 197.)

<sup>9</sup> Mr. Vlastos argues that we should be satisfied to accept Aristotle's statement that Plato thought time γενητός (251b 17), on the ground that he thought of it in terms of circular movement, which is a feature of cosmos, not chaos. (*CQ* XXXIII, 73–77. Cf. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 103.) Chaos is not a world already in existence before God intervenes. The materials of creation are not the sort of entities that exist in time; Plato is hard put to it to describe the odd kind of being Space has, timeless like the οὐσία of the Forms, but far less 'real' (*Tim.* 52a–c), while there can be no κίνησις in the absence of all order. But we can deny that chaos existed before creation, without asserting like Cornford that there never was a moment of creation (p. 37). Some philosophers find a meaning in the idea of continuous creation, but the Design argument need not be so understood. The First-Cause argument requires a beginning. Plato has not given us a satisfactory theory of time, but he clearly implies in the *Timaeus* that it is not infinite. We do best to take him at his word.

<sup>10</sup> 'Necessity' is a name for τὸ σωματοειδές, more precisely for the causal powers of matter, for the αἰτία, ὅσα μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχὸν ἄτακτον ἐκάστοτε ἐξεργάζονται (46e). Professor Dodds writes, 'In the *Timaeus*, however, besides these physical συνάτια which are popularly but falsely described as causes, we meet also with a real cause which is non-rational—the πλανωμένη αἰτία, or Errant

Cause, alias "Necessity," which shares with Mind the responsibility for the constitution of the Universe.' (*JHS* LXV, 20). I think the συνάτια of 46cd are causes, though never the sole sufficient causes of any event in the material world—Plato remarks δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συνάτια ἀλλὰ αἰτία εἶναι τῶν πάντων because he does not want us to forget the teleological action of νοῦς—and I think that ἀνάγκη does not stand for anything distinct from these συνάτια. When they are described in 46e as 'pushed by other things and pushing a third lot of things ἐξ ἀνάγκης', the phrase refers to that mysterious bond for which Hume professed he had looked in vain; it is sometimes called 'enforcement.' The words ὅσα μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχὸν ἄτακτον ἐκάστοτε ἐξεργάζονται (46e) forbid us to interpret Necessity in terms of Regularity of Sequence or natural law. Any order in the world is the work of νοῦς. 'Necessity in Plato was the very antithesis of natural law' (Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 171). What we mean by natural law was expressed by Plato in terms of order.

<sup>11</sup> κακοποιόν but not κακόν. See Robin La *Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, 573–80.

<sup>12</sup> ἀνωμαλότης is the condition of κίνησις, not the ἀρχή. (57e, with 58c and 57a. Cf. Vlastos, *CQ* XXXIII, 80.)

<sup>13</sup> 'Since no bodily changes can occur without the self-motion of soul, the other factor present in this chaos must be irrational motions of the World-Soul, considered in abstraction from the ordered revolutions of Reason' (*op. cit.* 205).

<sup>14</sup> This motion is surely inconceivable, but see Cornford *op. cit.*, 82, n. 1.

<sup>15</sup> See 36c and 37a–c and Cornford's Tables of Celestial Motions, *op. cit.*, 136.

need not account for its origin while the artistic shape into which he had cast his work made it awkward to do so. I think we shall find a reason why we should not assume what Plato has so carefully not said. Aristotle did not think the *Timaeus* uniform with the *Laws* in this respect or assume that it is impossible that Plato should change his tune.<sup>16</sup> His παναρμόνιος ψυχή is not likely to rest content for ever with the same idea. It may be that even within the one dialogue his doctrine is not entirely homogeneous.

Cornford, who assumes that the immanent World-Soul is the ἀρχή κινήσεως, inclines to the view that νοῦς δημιουργός is simply the rational element in this World-Soul, for ever trying to impose discipline on the vagaries of its 'lower self.' He searches for indications of this conflict.

Qua 'mental motions' of the World-Soul, the Circles of the Same and the Different, for all we are told, have a purely cognitive function. The Different is responsible for true judgments and beliefs about the sensible; ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν (λόγος) ἦ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταύτου κύκλος εἴτροχος ὡς αὐτὰ μηνύσει, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται (37bc).<sup>17</sup> But Cornford makes the Same 'rational' and the Different 'irrational' in a questionable sense. He argues that, since the Different (in its physical aspect) 'is associated with the planets and the Wandering Cause (πλανωμένη αἰτία), the possibility remains that the World-Soul is not wholly rational' (p. 76). The planets are set in the circuits in which the revolution of the Different was moving (38c), but their 'wanderings' are only apparent,<sup>18</sup> and as far as I can follow Cornford's explanation, involve no interruption in the revolution of the Different. There is no decisive evidence here for 'a semi-rational element of innate impulse.'

Again, referring to 34a, Cornford says that 'the six irrational motions do occur in nature' and argues that 'since all physical motions are ultimately caused by the self-moving soul, this passage supports the view that the World-Soul has an element of unreason and, like our own souls, is not perfectly controlled by the divine reason it contains' (p. 57).<sup>19</sup> The new-born baby, when it 'comes to be without intelligence at first,' moves with these six motions. But Mr. Vlastos remarks with justice that 'the analogy with the infant soul, apposite as it is, is unfortunate for Professor Cornford's hypothesis. It does not tell us how an irrational soul originates irrational motions, but how irrational motions throw out of gear the infant's soul.'<sup>20</sup> It is made clear in 43a-44a that τὸ σωματοειδές is to blame.

In order to cause the two physical motions specifically assigned to it, the World-Soul must be more than a mere thinking thing. But we are left to make this bare inference ourselves. Though it is an embodied soul, nothing is said to suggest that it is not λογιστικόν all through. In contrast the human soul is given parts that will conflict. To make it, the Gods got from the Demiurge an immortal principle of soul (ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον) similar to the World-Soul, and 'for a vehicle gave it the body as a whole and built round another form of soul, the mortal, ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσωκοδόμου τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον (69cd). 42ac and 89e refer to the old tripartite division. Are we meant to argue from microcosm to macrocosm? But it is clear that the World-Soul has no such parts 'built on.'

Yet it is a σύνθετον, put together from the intermediate kinds of Existence, Sameness, and Difference, and M. Robin has argued that 35a indicates that its unity is precarious. καὶ τρία λαβῶν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ιδεάν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὔσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμόττων βίᾳ. He fixes on δύσμεικτον. 'Ce qui arrive, c'est que l'Âme du monde, qui a été faite aussi bonne que possible, mais dans laquelle, comme dit le Timée (35a),

<sup>16</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνι γε οἶόν τε λέγειν ἦν οἶεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν ὑστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἢ ψυχῇ, ὡς φησὶν (1071 b 37). The reason suggested for Plato's silence is not satisfactory. If 'earlier' and 'later' have any temporal meaning, the World-Soul is older than its body. (34bc.)

<sup>17</sup> τὸ λογιστικόν here = αὐτὸ τὸ νοητόν. (See Cornford, *op. cit.* 95 n. 3.)

<sup>18</sup> *i.e.*, according to the science of Plato's time. (*Tim.* 39c, 40b and *Laws* 822a.)

<sup>19</sup> 'Six irrational motions' is misleading, for they are

irrational only in the odd sense that they are not axial rotation—τῶν ἐπιτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν (34a). Again in *Laws* 897c κυκλοφορία is the physical εἰκὼν of νοῦ κινήσις. But the other six motions need not want τάξις. (In *Tim.* 43ab they have none because νοῦς is not operative in infancy.) The *Laws* suggests that the impulse to aesthetic activity is the pleasure we get from the perception of τάξις, *i.e.*, pattern, in all kinds of κινήσις (see *Laws* 653d. Cf. *Ar. Problematika* 920 b 33.)

<sup>20</sup> *op. cit.*, 78.

l'Autre ne s'est laissé accommoder au Même que sous la contrainte, cesse de se rappeler "l'enseignement qu'elle a reçu de l'Ouvrier qui fut son père" (*Pol.* 273b): le cercle de l'Autre prétend tourner à sa guise sans obéir au cercle du Même, et il se produit alors dans l'Ame du monde des perversions analogues à celles que les passions produisent dans nos âmes.<sup>21</sup> But there are stages in its making. In 35a the intermediate kinds of Existence, Sameness, and Difference are mixed; then from this mixture what are called the Circles of the Same and the Different are *both* made (36c), so that any difficulty of mixing in 35a, however serious, cannot explain why the Circle of the Different should give trouble, while the Same turns peacably on its course.<sup>22</sup>

I am inclined to think that δύσμεικτον is a casual comment let slip without any deep design. In *Sophist* 255e f., the Same mixes with the Different in the sense that everything is the same as itself and different from other things, but on another occasion Plato might well call the Same and the Different δύσμεικτα. The word has no echo in the rest of the *Timaeus*.

Certainly the construction M. Robin puts upon it is not borne out by the behaviour of the World-Soul. A merely potential discord will not account for the actual evil in the world, and there is no suggestion anywhere that the World-Soul is divided against itself, no hint of these 'perversions,' and as Mr. Vlastos says, 'Of irrational motions in the World-Soul we know nothing in the *Timaeus*.'<sup>23</sup> This silence is surprising if M. Robin and Cornford are right.<sup>24</sup> Of course the description of the World-Soul is mythical, but it is reasonable to expect that their interpretation, if it is the true one, should be reflected in the details of the myth.

Then the theological situation is extraordinary if evil springs from a conflict between parts of the Divine World-Soul. The victory of νοῦς is admittedly incomplete, which must mean on this view that νοῦς has only partial success in making its 'lower self' see reason. But it is one thing to allow that God is not omnipotent, another to maintain that the cause of divine weakness lies within. Is God, like man, betrayed by what is false within? If Plato is preaching so startling a doctrine, why does he not speak out more plainly?<sup>25</sup> Cornford should explain Plato's silence. Theology apart, the dramatic interest of the struggle would be heightened if it were a conflict within the Divine World-Soul.

In the *Timaeus* there is no question of two souls at strife. Even if we do not accept Cornford's view that νοῦς δημιουργός is a mere hypostatisation of reason in the World-Soul, still the World-Soul seems very much the creature of the Demiurge, a submissive creature never in rebellion against its Creator. It corresponds, if anything, to the Good Soul of *Laws* X, not the Bad. Read without prejudice, the *Timaeus* gives no support to the view that evil has a spiritual origin. For all the skill that Cornford employs to draw forth this idea from the *Timaeus*, we see that it is not there—but a different idea, that evil comes from matter. Professor Dodds says that Plato blames 'the Irrational.'<sup>26</sup> But we have seen that on Plato's view a

<sup>21</sup> *Platon*, 228.

<sup>22</sup> M. Robin may connect the Different with change and even disorder on the more general ground that he equates the Different with 'l'illimité' (p. 156.) He argues that Forms, as well as particulars, are mixtures of πέρας and ἀπειρον. 'Toute Idée est, comme le disait Aristote, un mixte déterminé d'Un et d'Infini: l'infinité de l'Autre limitée par l'unité du Même' (p. 152.) Is the Different to be identified with the Indeterminate Dyad? I venture no opinion on so difficult a question. But the Different cannot be a very subversive element if it is present in every Form, when Forms are notoriously changeless.

<sup>23</sup> *op. cit.*, 73.

<sup>24</sup> M. Robin assumes that the rebellion of the World-Soul against the Demiurge in the *Politicus* has a parallel in the *Timaeus*. It is true that the Same is given supremacy over the Different in *Tim.* 36c, where the κράτος has an astronomical significance, but there is not the smallest hint that this supremacy is ever threatened in the World-Soul. In the infant human soul it is, but not really by the rebellion of the Different. και δὴ και τότε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πλείστην και μεγίστην παρεχόμενα κίνησιν, μετὰ τοῦ ῥέοντος ἐνδέλεχῶς ὀχέτου κινουσαί

και σφοδρῶς σείουσαι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιόδους, τὴν μὲν ταύτου παντάπασιν ἐπέδησαν ἐναντία αὐτῆ ῥέουσαι και ἐπέσχον ἀρχουσαν και ἰούσαν, τὴν δ' αὖ θεατέρου διέσεισαν . . . . . (43cd. Cf. 44a) Matter is to blame. Even in the *Politicus* the material view of evil is fundamental. (See Vlastos *op. cit.*, 80.) The World-Soul grows forgetful and careless—τούτων δὲ αὐτῶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον (273b).

According to M. Robin the responsibility for evil falls on the World-Soul but in his view the World-Soul is not God (*Platon*, 229).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. p. 72 *infra*.

<sup>26</sup> Professor Dodds thinks primarily of the contrast between Reason and the Passions. When he turns 'from Plato's view of man to his view of Nature,' he suggests that Plato 'has projected into his conception of Nature that stubborn irrationality which he was more and more compelled to admit in man' (*op. cit.*, 21). Plato may have grown more despondent over human nature, but recognition of the surd-element in the world is not in itself a proof of pessimism. If you choose to describe the world in the Pythagorean πέρας ἀπειρον language, you cannot have one term without the other.

surd-element is present in the world independently of any mind, human or divine. Matter is essentially ἄλογον. A mindless universe would be irrational in this sense.

Of course, it is useless to pretend that the activities of νοῦς and its relation to the World-Soul are perfectly comprehensible. When Plato warns us that we shall not understand his myth of creation, it is obviously rash to assign a literal meaning to each part of the complex symbol and expect that by combining these meanings we shall construct a theory a philosopher will accept or reject on strictly philosophic grounds.<sup>27</sup> The most we can hope to do is to seize the main ideas it illustrates. Cornford takes the World-Soul very seriously, on the ground that for Plato it is 'literally true' that the world is a ζῷον<sup>28</sup> and suggests that the Demiurge may be an element within that soul. I shall try to show that this reading involves difficulties that make it seem unlikely that Plato wished the myth to be understood in this way. And I suggest that Cornford has allowed too much weight to considerations that are not native, or at least not central, to the *Timaeus*, and so obscured the main theme.

That theme was set by Anaxagoras—νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν. Order in the world is the work of divine πρόνοια. The *Timaeus* might be called a dramatised version of the Argument from Design—only the Demiurge is not the Architect of the world; he does not plan, but execute, making a copy of αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον. The argument is not stated in the *Timaeus*. We do not find Plato 'proving *a priori* both that order is from its own nature inseparable from thought, and that it can never, of itself, or from some unknown principle, belong to matter.'<sup>29</sup> In other dialogues there are many indications of a συγγένεια between νοῦς and τάξις. For example in *Philebus* 26e–39d νοῦς is the efficient cause of every mixture in which πέρας is united with ἄπειρον, while in 65a–66b νοῦς is said to have a special affinity with the formal elements responsible for the goodness of the mixture. This conviction that intelligence is linked with order and value has its roots in metaphysical depths which are not plumbed by the *Timaeus*. In 30a Plato says simply that God being good, and desiring all things to be good, brought cosmos out of chaos.

No one would dispute that this is the message of the *Timaeus*.<sup>30</sup> But what of the suggestion that the benevolent Intelligence is simply an element in the World-Soul? It is only a suggestion—Cornford points out the danger of dogmatism—but still he regards it as based on a certainty. For, in his view, one thing is certain and the rest is lies—the world is an animal. Hume says this notion was 'common to almost all the theists of antiquity.' 'For though sometimes the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as if they thought the world the workmanship of God: yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body whose organisation renders it subservient to him.'<sup>31</sup> In the *Timaeus* the word ζῷον is used without much apology. Plato does not try to show that the world has the unity peculiar to an organism. Plato says perfunctorily that nothing has such value as νοῦς, and νοῦς cannot exist apart from ψυχή; so God made the world a ζῷον (30ab).<sup>32</sup> What is at the back of his mind is the thought of the world as an animal that can move itself. In his *History of Western Philosophy* Lord Russell has some interesting remarks on the imaginative background of Aristotle's physical theories. He explains how 'animals have lost their importance in our imaginative picture of the world'; how 'to the modern man of science the body of an animal is a very elaborate machine,' while 'to the Greek it seemed more natural to assimilate apparently lifeless motions to those of animals.'<sup>33</sup> Plato shows the same tendency, but not continuously, as we have seen.<sup>34</sup> Hume was right

<sup>27</sup> It is surely misleading to suggest that the notion of scientific probability is applicable to a metaphysical theory. Cf. Vlastos, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–3.

<sup>28</sup> See Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 34, n. 1. He assumes that in 30b τῆ ἀληθείᾳ stamps the ζῷον language as literal truth, whereas the rest of the sentence διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν is 'myth.'

<sup>29</sup> Hume, *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, 224.

<sup>30</sup> Unless those who regard the Demiurge as a symbol for the Form of the Good or who identify Forms with Minds (see p. 72, n. 49). In spite of 50d, I assume that νοῦς δημιουργός is not a Form.

<sup>31</sup> *op. cit.*, 211.

<sup>32</sup> Cornford has to add—'Of course it is not *made*; it is an

eternal animal.' With some *malice* Hume had remarked that, if you say the world is an animal, you more or less have to say it arose from generation. 'Plato, too, so far as he is intelligible, seems to have adopted some such idea in his *Timaeus*.'

<sup>33</sup> *A History of Western Philosophy*, 226–7.

<sup>34</sup> Consider the reasoning of *Laws* 895c or *Phaedrus* 245e. We easily imagine that the sight of an animal moving itself suggests the principle that ψυχή is the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, and that Plato, having reached the general principle, should then on the strength of it feel justified in calling the world an animal. Yet as *Laws* 898e f. shows, he realised that it is not necessary that the soul which is the ἀρχή should be related to the body moved as our soul is to our body.

in saying that the ancient philosophers are torn between the Divine Animal view of the world and the Divine Workman—obviously the favourite notion in the *Timaeus*. Where the Divine Workman holds the stage, the idea of motion as the self-movement of an animal is suppressed; we have already seen how carefully Plato abstains from making the World-Soul responsible for κίνησις in chaos. The two notions are perhaps not compatible with one another.

I doubt if it is possible to treat νοῦς δημιουργός as a symbol for an element in the World-Soul. If it were, we should have to construe the διακόσμησις entirely in terms of the control a rational soul exercises over its body. In our case that is limited, to say the least of it, but νοῦς δημιουργός is supposed to be the source of whatever order is to be found throughout the world, unless in corners where other minds have been at work. Νοῦς brings the cosmos into being, that is, if Cornford is right, νοῦς makes its own body. If an organism can be said to make itself, the parallel is vague in the extreme. Of course, Aristotle would maintain that an organism owes its σύστασις, its organic unity, to the fact that it is animate, though not to πρόνοια on its own part.<sup>35</sup> But surely ‘unconscious teleology’ is Aristotelian, not Platonic at all. For Plato order is always the work of νοῦς acting with conscious purpose.

Accordingly in the *Timaeus* νοῦς is a Workman struggling with materials external to himself. Of course, we can think of our body as so much material for the exercise of τέχνη, but then we are treating it as an external object like any other, oblivious of the unique relation in which we stand to our own body. If Plato wished us to conceive of God’s relation to the world after the fashion of our body–soul relation, why did he not say so plainly without introducing the misleading image of the workman? <sup>36</sup> The truth is that the teleological argument for the existence of God does not require immanence, and the designing intelligence does not need to have a body. I think that the *Timaeus* is best understood in terms of this argument, and that νοῦς is a transcendent intelligence.

The material view of evil accompanies the Divine Workman. When ψυχή comes to the fore as ἀρχή κινήσεως, the ‘cause of all things’ (*Laws* 896d), the spiritual view replaces the material. Is the spiritual view more positive? (The material view is privative of course; evil is a lack of order.) *Laws* X does not bear this out. The not very well defined ἀμαθία and ἀκράτεια, in which moral evil consists according to *Laws* 863d (*cf.* 734b), suggest some evolution in Plato’s ethics, but not so complete a break with the past. The material view says that disorder originates in matter, the spiritual, in mind. Thus far Plato’s view of evil varies as νοῦς δημιουργός or ψυχή ἀρχή κινήσεως predominates.

Those who disdain the Divine Workman as mere embroidery take the ψυχή ἀρχή κινήσεως principle very seriously, as indeed it deserves. (It is the parent of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover which inspired the First-Cause argument, which was refined by Leibniz into the cosmological argument.) According to Mr. Vlastos it has little or no significance apart from the Design argument of the *Timaeus*. ‘The proposition that the soul is πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον (*Laws* 891e) merely denotes the supremacy of the soul’s teleological action *within the created universe*.’<sup>37</sup> But the two arguments, starting from different premises, are logically distinct, and we cannot be sure that ψυχή ἀρχή κινήσεως is indistinguishable from νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν.<sup>38</sup> I think that Mr. Vlastos is mutilating the *Laws* to force conformity with the *Timaeus*. *Laws* X has something important of its own to say.

On the other hand, those who pin all their faith to the First-Cause argument sometimes

<sup>35</sup> 411 b 7.

<sup>36</sup> Philebus 30 a–c does suggest that the σωμαστικά and λογικά we apply to our own bodies will illustrate the activity of the cosmic νοῦς, but the argument is most obscure.

<sup>37</sup> *op. cit.*, 81. Mr. Vlastos asks, ‘How much could Plato mean when he says that the soul is the cause of all becoming and perishing? At its face-value this asserts that the soul is itself the cause of the instability of becoming; that apart from soul reality would be untroubled by

transience. But this is grotesquely unPlatonic. When Plato does ask himself, “Is soul more akin to being or becoming?” he can only answer, “It is in every way more like being.” (*Phaedon* 79c.) Vlastos has surely forgotten *Sophist* 248e f. where change and life and soul are given a place in ‘that which is perfectly real.’

<sup>38</sup> The Design argument is formally impeccable, if it does not insist on omniscience and omnipotence. The First-Cause argument is based on the false assumption that every series must have a first term.

suggest that *Laws X* will explain what is puzzling in the World-Soul of the *Timaeus*. Do they recognise what a vague account of ψυχή we are given?

In *Laws* 896e we are confronted with a surprising catalogue of actions and passions. For the First-Cause argument to have force, ψυχή must surely be an ἀρχή in the full sense. Plato is surely not saying that all these are absolute beginnings, having no cause. Unless by Existentialists such a claim is not made, except for acts of will. To be an ἀρχή, ψυχή must be first and foremost a will. We cannot pretend that this is what Plato is saying; it is what he ought to be saying. For fundamentally the argument of *Laws X* is 'the metaphysical argument from our own inalienable experience of ourselves as causes and voluntary agents to the conception of God as will and source of power.' If so 896e is rather misleading.

Again is the cosmic ἀρχή a single soul? In 896e δ (as in d 10) ψυχή is undifferentiated 'soul' rather than 'a soul' or 'souls'—'mind,' as one might speak of 'mind and matter.' But in e4 the Athenian has raised the question of number. Μία ἢ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρινούμαι. δυοῖν μὲν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τάναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι (*i.e.*, we are to assume for the purposes of argument not less than two.) But we see the motion of the οὐρανός is like 'the motion of reason.' ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσιν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά (898c). So we hear no more of a Bad Soul. It seems that Plato has raised the Devil only to lay him again.<sup>39</sup> He was not needed to explain the motion of the world as a whole. But what of disorder within the world? We must grapple somehow with the problem of evil. If *Laws* 896d is a serious statement and evil has a spiritual cause, it is caused either by a Bad Soul, or by discordant elements in the Good Soul.<sup>40</sup> That Plato should invoke a hypothetical Devil to explain hypothetical disorder in the motion of the world, affords a slight presumption that in this frame of mind he would choose to attribute the evil within the world to a Bad Soul. That is all we can say in defence of the Devil.<sup>41</sup> But no text in *Laws X* gives positive support to the alternative.

On the other hand, a Devil would prove an embarrassment if the Good Soul is thought of as animating the world. *Laws X* is not clear on the question of immanence. 896d—ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις—might seem decisive, and in 895c it looks as if Plato is taking the world to be an animal self-moved by its soul, but immanence is not required by the ψυχή ἀρχή κινήσεως principle, and raises an obvious problem. (If all changes in the world are caused by conscious states of activities of its soul, the world is very unlike any other known animal.) In fact, it is after ψυχή is proved to be the ἀρχή that Plato asks whether the sun, for example, is driven round by a soul animating it as our soul animates its body, or whether soul pushes it from outside or moves it in some other way, without committing himself to an answer. The question is left open.<sup>42</sup> Presumably the same reasoning applies to the world as a whole. If so, the cosmic ἀρχή may be ψιλή σώματος like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. But if the star-souls animate the star-bodies in the ordinary way, probably the Good Soul is immanent in the world. Then how will it tolerate a rival? A Pantheistic system may find room for star-souls—it must accommodate humanity somehow—but two cosmic ἀρχαί of comparable rank is another matter. I do not think that we can assume that Plato is saying that the world is animated either simultaneously or successively by a Good and a Bad Soul. It is easy to see why Professor Cornford dropped the Devil and chose the other

<sup>39</sup> Assuming that the existence of a Devil is definitely denied in *Pol.* 270a, and that the words δύο τινέ θεῶ φρονούντε ἐαυτοῖς ἐναντία indicate a Good and a Bad Soul, this denial is irrelevant to our interpretation of the *Laws*, as the general attitude to evil is different in the two works. The *Politicus* takes the material view, the *Laws* the spiritual. (The R. P. Festugière traces above all in the *Politicus* 'une certaine influence du dualisme iranien,' with definite limits. *Rev. de philologie*, XXI 43-4.)

<sup>40</sup> Or by human souls. Perhaps this possibility should be considered.

<sup>41</sup> Professor Dodds will not take the Devil seriously on the

ground that 'the inferior soul has no more than a potentiality of evil, which it realises, as we are told further on (897b), only when "it associates with mindlessness"' (*JHS* LXV, 21 'Plato and the Irrational'). But in 897b3 ψυχή is not yet differentiated into souls good and bad. (See note 43.) We might as well say that the Good Soul is only potentially good.

<sup>42</sup> See *Laws* 898d-899b. The question of number also is left unsettled in the summing-up. ἐπειδὴ ψυχή μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἰτίαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν (899b5). It was not the number so much as the quality of souls that interested Plato.

form of the spiritual view of evil, which, however, is not stated in the *Laws*. There is no hint that the Good Soul contains any alloy.<sup>43</sup>

Thus the clear outlines of the ψυχή portrayed in *Laws* X on closer scrutiny dissolve in vagueness, and we feel less and less confident that it will help us to explain the *Timaeus*. Yet we want to see Plato's thought as one, if we can, and it is not easy to refrain from assimilating the Good Soul to the World-Soul, which, we have seen, Plato connects sometimes with κίνησις.<sup>44</sup> Then we are faced once more with the problem, How is the Principle of Motion related to the Principle of Order? <sup>45</sup>

Evil provides a touchstone for any scheme we construct.

Cornford's synthesis, in which νοῦς δημιουργός becomes reason within the World-Soul, has a clarity and consistency it seems senseless to mar, but it does make what is divine not wicked but weak, and largely responsible for the evil of the world. Plato would have been shocked. θεός οὐδ'αμῆ οὐδ'αμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε δικαιοτάτος.<sup>46</sup>

Cornford did prepare a line of retreat. Perhaps τὸ θεῖον, τὸ θειότατον rather, is not a mind at all. If the Demiurge represents an element in the World-Soul, 'the desire for goodness will then reside in the World-Soul: the universe will aspire towards the perfection of its model in the realm of Forms, and the model will hold a position analogous to that of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, who causes motion as the object of desire.'<sup>47</sup> Αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον is the *Être Suprême*. But what corresponds to the Unmoved Mover in Plato's scheme of things is ψυχή itself, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν.<sup>48</sup> Cornford does not insist, but his suggestion reminds us of more radical interpretations which merge the Demiurge in a Form. Sooner or later we must ask ourselves, 'Is the Demiurge nothing but a symbol for the formal cause of order, the Good or the One?' There is no inconsistency in this supposition—only, if we adopt it, we must be ready to admit that the *Timaeus* does not explain how this world has come to be—not even in the limited sense in which the Design argument can explain the world. The Forms 'stand immutable in solemn aloofness.' Nothing will bridge the gulf between that world and this—unless we can be persuaded that the Forms are meant to be efficient causes.<sup>49</sup> There is not evidence to justify our foisting this paralogism on Plato. Of course, the *Phaedo* claimed too much for the Forms,<sup>50</sup> but the later dialogues demand a mind to account for the world. Sophist 248e, giving change, life, soul, understanding a place in 'Reality,' marks a step in self-criticism as decisive in its way as the beginning of the *Parmenides*. The *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*, all make some mind an ἀρχή which is apparently ultimate. Yet the Good or the One is still for Plato the *ens realissimum*; all minds may somehow depend on it,<sup>51</sup> but Plato does not explain how this can be, and in the absence of an explanation from him, it seems we must accept mind as an ἀρχή, and count it divine.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>43</sup> In 897a 'soul' includes plenty of evil passions, but at once in b7, a division is made into souls of opposite quality. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος . . . . . τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλήρες, ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κερκτημένον;

<sup>44</sup> See p. 66, *supra*.

<sup>45</sup> The *Laws* is not altogether silent about νοῦς τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκῶς (966e f.) It looks like an element in the Good Soul (898c). In 897b (νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα . . . . .) the meaning of νοῦς is fixed as 'reasonableness' by contrast with ἄνοια, and ψυχή is not necessarily importing an ally from outside.

<sup>46</sup> *Theaetetus* 176b (*Rep.* 379c was more explicit).

<sup>47</sup> *Plato's Cosmology*, 39.

<sup>48</sup> *Laws* 896a.

<sup>49</sup> M. Robin says that Forms are minds. 'Quel est en effet dans la théologie de Platon le rôle du Démon? C'est de conférer la réalité à un vivant qui soit l'image d'un autre vivant. Il isole donc mythiquement le pouvoir causal des Idées, l'efficacité génératrice qui appartient aux réalités du monde intelligible à la fois formelles et vivantes' (*Platon*, 248). On the next page, 'le Démon symboliserait donc l'Intellect contemplant l'Intelligible et en organisant une copie . . . .' (249.) For a clue we turn to M. Robin's interpretation of *Sophist* 248e. 'Comment l'Être "qui est totalement être," qui est à la fois l'Être et le tout,

pourrait-il ne pas posséder l'intellect? . . . En les rapprochant de ce morceau du Sophiste, on est incliné à considérer en effet le monde idéal comme un intellect dans laquelle chaque pensée est un être ou chaque être une pensée et qui possède vie et activité.' (p. 154.) 'Enfin, si l'Être "totalement" ou "absolument existant," dont il est question dans le Sophiste (248e sqq.) est la même chose que le Bien et si le Bien est la même chose que Dieu, ou réciproquement, on ne s'étonnera plus alors que Platon ait justement attribué à cette plénitude de l'Être la vie, l'âme et l'intellect, c'est à dire la plus haute personnalité.' (251.)

<sup>50</sup> See Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, 79 n. 1. Aristotle's criticism is a fair inference from the *Phaedo*, but I think that Plato saw he had claimed too much and withdrew. (Cf. Robin, *La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, 88–92, 110–11, 106–14.)

<sup>51</sup> Brochard maintained that νοῦς δημιουργός, Plato's God, is a 'mélange d'Idées,' subordinate to a superior principle. (*Études de Philosophie Ancienne*, 95–8.)

<sup>52</sup> Diès sums up the ambiguous position. 'Ainsi, pour la pensée platonicienne, on peut et l'on doit dire que l'Intellect est Dieu, mais que l'Être est plus divin que l'Intellect, parce que l'Être ou le divin est la source à laquelle Dieu lui-même participe. La pensée philosophique est restée,



But 'in the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness.' 'Si Dieu se définit comme la cause de l'ordre, il ne peut donc à aucun titre être cause de désordre.'<sup>53</sup> The Rév. Père Festugière, who agrees in the main with Cornford—he thinks that νοῦς is not distinct from the World-Soul, the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, 'le vrai Dieu du Timée'<sup>54</sup>—takes a different view of evil. He blames matter. Does he mean χῶρα, or the Divine Workman's materials in general?

(A) If matter is χῶρα simply, Plato's ὕλη,<sup>55</sup> what of disorderly κίνησις? Can we make χῶρα entirely responsible by arguing that the κίνησις in the external world with which we are concerned here, is always an event in space, and that the surd-element that Plato sees in every particular is introduced by χῶρα? Then the World-Soul is the cause of κίνησις,<sup>56</sup> but not of its ἀταξία. (On the other hand, κίνησις *qua* 'mental motion' can be ἀτακτος too. And in his version of the material view Plato himself distributes the blame more widely.)

(B) Alternatively 'matter' means all the materials of creation, and κίνησις is itself an ἄπειρον. The distinction between A and B seems tenuous, perhaps artificial, yet the theological consequences are not trifling. If the World-Soul causes κίνησις, and κίνησις is an ἄπειρον, and evil consists in the absence of order, then the World-Soul shares in the responsibility for evil. Perhaps 'responsibility' is too moral a word; we might refuse to say more than that the World-Soul initiates κίνησις in the world, treating it as a cosmic force rather than a personality. Still it *is* the cause, the αἴτιον. If he chooses this line of thought, I do not think that the Rév. Père Festugière succeeds in vindicating Plato's God—if the World-Soul is God.

But what if the World-Soul is only a lesser spirit? The *Timaeus* gives the impression that νοῦς is a transcendent intelligence which makes the World-Soul, and whatever 'making' means, it suggests some kind of subordination.<sup>57</sup> As the principle of Order, withdrawn from the world in this way, God may be freed from all responsibility for evil. Then if we are bent on synthesis we may assume that the World-Soul is the cause of κίνησις, and still trace evil to the recalcitrance of the Workman's materials. For God, κίνησις is so much material. The World-Soul is partly responsible, but God is absolved. θεὸς ἀνάτιος.

Thus the spiritual and material views are reconciled, or rather something is conceded to each, but the compromise leaves us uneasy. Our construction is very obviously a pastiche. The fact that the World-Soul is made by νοῦς is disquieting. As we said, the making indicates at least some kind of dependence—what, is not easy to say. (Professor Hackforth quotes Proclus—εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τὸ πᾶν ἔννοον γενέσθαι, δεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς ὑποδοχὴ γὰρ ἔστιν αὕτη τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ὁ νοῦς ἐμφαίνεται τοῖς ὄγκοις τοῦ παντός . . . .<sup>58</sup> But Proclus does not help us greatly.) The notion of a spiritual hierarchy is not obviously unPlatonic. In Plato and Aristotle the tendency towards monotheism is visible but by no means triumphant. (I have assumed that Plato uses ὁ θεός to indicate the highest among divine minds, and I think it likely that this God is dependent on the Good or the One.) It is strange, however, that the cosmic ἀρχὴ κινήσεως should be placed in a position of inferiority to any mind whatsoever. If we explain this by Plato's prejudice in favour of the changeless, another difficulty threatens. Νοῦς is not merely a 'mental motion'; it brings order to an external world. Even if its priority is not temporal, νοῦς might challenge the claim of the World-Soul to be First Cause.

Our scheme may include more of what Plato actually says, but it cannot give so simple

depuis Xénophane, profondément hostile à tout anthropomorphisme. Elle ne peut créer l'intelligence et le monde sans faire appel à quelque chose de vivant qui tend, quoi qu'elle fasse, vers la personnalité humaine et vers des modes humains de penser et d'agir. Mais elle se protège contre ce danger en accentuant toujours davantage l'immuable et impassible impersonnalité de l'Être, et, pour elle, des vocables masculins comme ὁ νοῦς, ὁ θεός, ne sont que secondaires et dérivés par rapport aux vocables neutres, τὸ ὄν, τὸ θεῖον. (*Autour de Platon*, 564.)

<sup>53</sup> Festugière, *Rev. de philologie* XXI, 41.

<sup>54</sup> *op. cit.*, 20.

<sup>55</sup> See note 5.

<sup>56</sup> Festugière calls χῶρα 'une possibilité de mutation'

(p. 34), but the World-Soul is the ἀρχή (p. 39).

<sup>57</sup> Professor Hackforth takes this to mean that the soul is a γένεσις, not a thing created in time, but one whose being depends on something more ultimate. (*CQ* XXX, 5) This doctrine will not suit with *Laws* X. There ψυχὴ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως is itself the cause of becoming and perishing of all things. It is not made dependent on νοῦς. Hackforth tries to explain away Plato's silence on this point by arguing that, in the *Laws*, 'his object is to lay down the necessary minimum of philosophical doctrine required for a sound basis of religion and morality.'

<sup>58</sup> Proclus, In *Tim.* I p. 40 2 (Diehl). See Hackforth, *op. cit.*, 8, n. 1.

an account of the relation between νοῦς δημιουργός and ψυχὴ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως as Cornford's.<sup>59</sup> If we are determined to bring them together, we might do better to adopt his general view, stifling our doubts about the immanence of νοῦς, and replace his view of evil, which proved a stumbling-block, by the suggestion that evil is caused by matter in the sense of χώρα.

But perhaps the two are best apart. The obscurities that surround each are not dispelled by attempts to unite them. We cannot help wishing to make a system of Plato's thought, but we must regard any proposed combination with suspicion and ask if it is wise to impose a unity whose form is not clearly indicated by Plato himself. Except in the most superficial way he has not brought the two together; in fact, he drew them apart. In the beginning πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, for Anaxagoras had announced in his cryptic way that νοῦς gave order to the world and set it in motion. Plato seized on these suggestions and followed each separately where it led him. He had learned the lesson that Socrates taught—that we must follow wherever the λόγος leads, pursuing each line of reasoning to its own conclusion, and prepared to discard anything that seemed satisfactory before if it will not agree with the new idea. For the most part Plato thinks in this truly philosophic spirit.

The *Timaeus* myth brings the Divine Workman and the Divine Animal together, but the combination is fanciful, not reasoned. Our first impulse was sound, to take the *Timaeus* as a picturesque presentment of teleological metaphysics, complete enough within its limits, and assume that while the World-Soul has its place in the story, philosophically speaking its relation to the Divine Workman will not bear scrutiny.

If Plato ever reached the stage of synthesis and made a system out of his ideas περὶ τὰ θεῖα, he did not record it for us. We get no help from outside; Aristotle never mentions Plato's God. After all we possess only enigmatic fragments of his thought. It is only fair to remember this when we are tempted to agree with Bayle. 'Vous croirez peut-être qu'un Platonicien qui donnoit à Dieu une nature incorporelle auroit mis à bout facilement les sectateurs de Straton; mais ne vous fiez trop à cela, car en 1. lieu la doctrine Platonique touchant la divinité n'est pas uniforme dans les oeuvres de Platon: on y trouve tant de choses qui se combattent les unes les autres, qu'on ne sait à quoi s'en tenir. 2. Ce n'est qu'un tissu de suppositions arbitraires qu'il debite magistralement sans les prouver. 3. Il est si obscur qu'il rebute tous les esprits qui ne cherchent que la lumière'.<sup>60</sup> Bayle is severe, but not altogether unjust. There is no entity that we can call 'Plato's theology.'

M. MELDRUM.

<sup>59</sup> The *Timaeus* is against the hypothesis that νοῦς and ψυχὴ form one transcendent mind. But ψυχὴ need not be immanent, as Plato admits in *Laws* 898e f., so the single

transcendent mind is a possible development of Plato's thought.

<sup>60</sup> *Continuation des Pensées diverses.* (CVI p. 508).